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Abstract 
The global financial crisis demonstrated that because of global economic integration and interdependence, global 
collaboration is needed to create an effective global regulatory framework and a stable international financial system. 
In this conjuncture, the global governance system and the G-20 gained importance. The aim of this paper is to 
analyze the role of the G-20 in recovery from the global crisis within the context of global governance reform. To this 
end, the global governance concept is defined and effectiveness and legitimacy of the G-20 are analyzed by utilizing 
this concept. Debates and negotiations among the developed and developing countries at different platforms such as 
the G-20 summits are analyzed. International and domestic political obstacles to global governance reforms are 
investigated. It was concluded that the financial crisis enhanced the significance of the global governance system 
since it was clearly seen that the restructuring of the international financial and monetary system required 
collaboration of the developing and developed countries. The G-20 came out as the organization that could abate the 
representativeness, coherence and compliance deficits of the global governance system. Nonetheless, because of 
diverging interests of the Anglo-Saxons, the E.U. and the developing countries, it is expected that global governance 
reforms will proceed slowly. It is anticipated that if the interests of the Anglo-Saxons, the Europeans and the 
developing countries diverge furthermore, the reform of the global governance system may become a conflict zone of 
international politics. 
© 2011 Published by Elsevier Ltd. Selection and/or peer-review under responsibility 7th International 
Strategic Management Conference 
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1. Main text  
The global crisis, which started in 2008 in the United States, quickly spread and dragged many 
countries into recession. The crisis revealed that the world economy has integrated to such an extent that 
countries have to cooperate and synchronize their economic policies to constitute an effective global 
regulatory framework and to avert a global depression. In this conjuncture, the global governance concept 
gained importance. The reform of the global governance system and the role of the G-20 in this process 
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were researched in many studies and discussed in various international platforms. The main objective of 
this paper is to evaluate the role of the G-20 in recovery from the global crisis within the context of the 
global governance reforms. To this end, the global governance concept is defined and significance of the 
global governance reforms for recovery is evaluated. Effectiveness and legitimacy of the G-20 are 
analyzed by utilizing the global governance concept. The discussions and negotiations among the 
developed and developing countries about the global governance reforms are examined. International and 
domestic political obstacles to the global governance reforms and representativeness, coherence and 
compliance deficits of the G-20 are investigated.  
The article proceeds in the following manner. First, the global governance concept is defined and its 
increasing significance after the global crisis is evaluated. In the second section, the reform of the global 
governance system and the role of the G-20 in the reform process are analyzed in connection with efforts 
to accelerate the recovery from the global crisis. In the third section, obstacles to the reform of the global 
governance system and legitimacy and effectiveness deficits of the G-20 are investigated.  
2. Defining the Global Governance Concept 
Global governance concept has been researched by prominent scholars in the post-cold war period. 
[1][2][3][4] In little more than a decade the global governance concept, which was little known, became 
one of the central orienting themes in international studies. [5] 
The global governance concept is defined as the collective management of common problems at the 
international level. [6] All the institutions, regimes, processes, partnerships, and networks that contribute 
to collective action and problem solving at the international level are included in the global governance 
concept. A broader definition of the concept is as follows: “systems of rule (rule means control or 
steering) at all levels of human activity-from the family to the international organization-in which the 
pursuit of goals through the exercise of control has transnational repercussions.” [7] 
The global governance concept gained importance after it was seen that global threats strain state-
capacities [8] and after the incapability of individual states at finding solutions to transnational problems 
was seen during developments such as the collapse of the Bretton Woods System and the debt crises of 
developing countries in the 1980s. [9] The global economic crisis, which started in 2008, demonstrated 
that global crises require global action and effective global governance. [10] Rising number of problems 
that necessitated global cooperation increased interest on the global governance concept. [11] 
It is argued that “the hard shell of states became more like a semi-permeable membrane through which 
all manner of political, social, cultural and economic matters pass, some of them of considerable moment 
and a good many of them not mediated by the state.” [12] Change in states’ structure multiplied 
interdependence among states, required cooperation among them with regards to many economic, 
political and security issues and enhanced the importance of effective global governance. 
Even if the necessity for global cooperation and effective global governance has been clearly 
understood, democracy deficit of the international institutions, which hinders effective global governance, 
is also recognized. [13] It is argued that global governance is not democratically legitimate [14] and 
developing countries are underrepresented at international institutions. Meanwhile, some oppose to the 
argument that international institutions lack democracy when compared with established democracies 
rather than ideal models of democracy. [15] 
Apart from the discussions about the under-representation of developing countries and 
overrepresentation of developed countries, there are also discussions about the participation and 
representation of non-state actors. Nonetheless, many argue that it is not realistic to achieve democracy in 
global governance beyond the nation state [16] and that states are very central actors in the global 
governance processes. [17] Martin argues that the experience of the G-20 prior to the global crisis of 2008 
demonstrated that important decisions about the global economy can be made only by political decisions 
Gokhan Ozkan / Procedia Social and Behavioral Sciences 24 (2011) 159–166 161
at the state level. [18] Yunker argues that the global situation is more accurately described as global 
anarchy rather than as global governance. [19]  
3. The Global Crisis, Global Governance and the G-20 
The global crisis enhanced the significance of global governance, particularly with regards to the 
governance structures of the international financial institutions since it is expected that the international 
conflicts over international monetary system and currency policy will intensify. [20] Effective 
cooperation among major economies and collective action are essential since if mercantilist strategies are 
followed by all major countries, it may lead to deflationary pressure on the world economy. [21] Global 
governance and multilateralism gained importance as states started to deal with economic, political and 
security issues in and around multilateral forums. [22] 
Even before the global crisis, it was argued that credibility of the G-8 and global governance system 
waned in terms of who sets the rules of the game and why these rules are in place. [23] It was argued that 
the systemic shift in the global balance of power from advanced countries to developing countries and the 
gradual evaporation of US leadership led countries to seek for global governance reforms. [24] As the US 
declined in relative terms as a hegemon, it lost the capability to railroad through decisions in international 
summits without minding to win the argument in advance. [25] Global crisis intensified the debates and 
accelerated the reform process. In the words of Henry Kissinger:   
“Any new conceptualization of world order is not designed as an emergency measure, but that such a 
redesign needs an emergency.”[26] Nonetheless, as can be seen clearly from previous examples, global 
governance reforms are not easy to make. For example, in the middle of 1990s, recommendations to 
reform the Security Council and establishment of an Economic Security Council were resisted vigorously. 
[27] 
The global crisis necessitated the restructuring of the decision-making mechanisms of international 
institutions in a way that gives more voice to the developing countries. For example, the global crisis, by 
changing the balance of power towards the developing countries furthermore, affected the balance in the 
World Trade Organization (WTO) and moved the organization towards greater multipolarity. [28] In this 
conjuncture, the G-20 came out as the right institution, which would help alleviate the legitimacy and 
effectiveness issues of the G-7/8. The ascendancy of the G-20 is assigned to a number of factors such as 
its recognition as a leading forum for managing processes during the global crisis, its legitimacy 
stemming from representing almost 90 percent of world’s gross domestic product, 80 percent of the 
global trade and 65 percent of the world population and its structure that encouraged the participation of 
developing countries such as the BRIC countries. [29] 
Making the G-20 the main platform for international economic cooperation by including the 
developing countries has deepened the democratic legitimacy of global economic governance [30] since a 
necessary (though not sufficient) condition for any properly functioning government or governance 
system is that the major players buy into it; by giving them a bigger say in the decision-making. [31] 
Scharpf argues that global governance must rest on input as well as output legitimacy. [32] The traditional 
source of legitimacy for international institutions, problem-solving effectiveness is no longer sufficient 
according to many critics. [33] In this regard, participation of the developing countries in decision-
making processes of the international financial institutions is seen essential. It is argued that attempting to 
fix the problems that caused the most recent crisis may lead to lagging behind actual developments on the 
financial marketplace and prepare the conditions for the next governance failure. [34] 
Ikenberry and Wright argues that as a result of changing balance of power in world politics, the shift in 
style, agendas, and institutional forms of global governance are likely to emerge. [35] Two forms of 
global governance are likely to grow in importance, informal steering committees such as G-20 and 
regional governance institutions.  
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The global financial crisis demonstrated that the international monetary system with the dollar as the 
global reserve currency is increasingly insufficient with regards to the fundamental principles such as 
confidence, stability and adjustment. In this connection, the G-20’s role to facilitate the policy 
cooperation among countries to restore confidence and to reform the existing international monetary 
system arrangements is seen essential. [36] All authors must sign the Transfer of Copyright agreement 
before the article can be published. This transfer agreement enables Elsevier to protect the copyrighted 
material for the authors, but does not relinquish the authors' proprietary rights. The copyright transfer 
covers the exclusive rights to reproduce and distribute the article, including reprints, photographic 
reproductions, microfilm or any other reproductions of similar nature and translations. Authors are 
responsible for obtaining from the copyright holder permission to reproduce any figures for which 
copyright exists. 
3.1. Criticisms against the G-20 
The G-20 has alleviated the legitimacy issue of the G7/8 at some extent. Nonetheless, it is still 
criticized on the grounds of lack of representativeness. It is argued that the G-20 should be replaced by a 
more representative institution. The Commission of Experts of the President of the United Nations 
General Assembly headed by Joseph Stiglitz called for the replacement of the G-20 with the Global 
Economic Coordination Council. [37] 
All 192 countries in the world have different agendas and concerns regarding the global governance 
after the global crisis of 2008. They are trying to participate in the restructuring of the international 
monetary trade and financial system in a number of different diplomatic and institutional arenas. In this 
context, it is argued that the exclusion of the vast majority of countries from G-20 limits the legitimacy of 
the G-20. [38] 
To become more inclusive and legitimate, the G-20 invited five non-member countries to the Seoul 
Summit. Malawi was invited in its capacity as chair of the African Union; Ethiopia as chair of the New 
Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD); Vietnam as chair of the Association of Southeast Asian 
Nations (ASEAN); Singapore as chair of the Global Governance Group (3G); and Spain as "one of the 10 
largest economies in the world. [39] 
There is controversy about the optimum number G-X members. A recent paper concludes that it is 
theoretically possible for a group of twenty leaders to reach a consensus agreement provided that they are 
farsighted about the impact of their decisions, seek opportunities for issue linkage, and fully disclose their 
values and interests. It is argued that the existing G-20 countries would be included in the G-20 according 
to different lists made by different organizations by different methods. The list of countries prepared by 
utilizing the Chinese “comprehensive national power” concept, the list of countries invited to the Major 
Economies Forum first convened by the U.S. in 2007 and the  list of countries prepared by Carin and 
Mehlenbacher come out with at least seventeen common countries. [40] 
4. Obstacles to a Representative, Legitimate and Effective G-20 
On the initial phases of the global crisis, there was consensus among the countries on the need for 
structural reforms in the existing global governance systems. In this environment, the G-20 gained 
importance and became the main platform for international economic cooperation. But as soon as the 
emergency receded, the appetite for fundamental reforms also receded and many promises made by the 
G-20 leaders remained unfulfilled. [41] It is argued that after cooperation of developed and developing 
countries in the initial emergency period, the international arena is becoming a conflict zone as competing 
interests complicate efforts to build the international consensus on many issues such as trade and currency 
policies. [42] It is argued that even if the G-20 was successful in coordinating national and international 
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stimulus packages at the initial phases of the global crisis, it took a little more than a year to see signs of 
summit fatigue and some degree of backtracking on the G-20 promises. [43] 
Helleiner argues that innovations in global financial governance and a new international financial 
system are likely to come into being through a slower and more incremental process of development than 
they did in 1940s when the Bretton Woods System was born. [44] He divides the process into four 
phases: a legitimacy crisis, an interregnum, a constitutive phase and an implementation phase. He states 
that even if the global crisis created a legitimacy crisis, the process has not passed into a constitutive 
phase from the interregnum phase yet. 
Even if the G-20 took important steps to coordinate fiscal policies and stimulus efforts, to reform the 
financial regulatory framework and to increase IMF’s financial resources, since reforms in decision-
making process of the IMF have come to a grinding halt, the emerging countries will still depend on their 
reserves to protect their financial stability. [45] The G-7 countries (minus France) were reluctant to 
publicly discuss fundamental reforms of the international monetary system within the G-20 process or to 
evaluate the expansion of the use of SDRs in spite of the demands from the developing countries, 
particularly the BRIC countries. The BRIC countries called for the reform of the international monetary 
system by replacing the dollar as the global reserve currency. [46] 
Even if the G-20 increased the participation of the emerging countries, there are still substantive and 
philosophical differences among the Anglo-Saxons, the European countries and the developing countries. 
It is argued that there are three challenges to make the G-20 framework operational, namely establishment 
of quantitative criteria, definition of goals, and enforcement mechanism. [47]  
Apart from differences among the Anglo-Saxons, the Europeans and the developing countries; there 
are differences between both sides of Atlantic, among the European countries and among the developing 
countries. For example, the European Union could not deal with the sovereign debt crisis in Greece for 
months, which deepened the crisis and caused contagion to other European countries. The G-20 was also 
ineffective and avoided public disagreement by backing from binding goals and transferring the problem 
to the International Monetary Fund. [48] It is argued that governments should concentrate on what the G-
20 can actually do rather than talking about the potential of the G-20 to reform the global governance 
system. [49] 
Sheng uses network analysis to find the right steps to improve financial and global governance. [50] 
He states that the network analysis views the global financial architecture as a “complex evolutionary 
network of local networks, highly concentrated with power law distribution of transactions by value, 
highly interactive, and currently prone to financial instability due to volatile capital flows arising from 
structural imbalances and policy errors.” He argues that even if even if the balance of power is changing 
from developed countries to emerging countries such as China and India, basic rules of game have not 
changed. There is still strong will to protect the status quo and the inherent push by vested interests for 
asset bubbles and higher leverage remains intact. [51] 
It is argued that global governance may be corroded if a power transition from the United States to 
China occurs without any hegemonic succession. It is argued that even if there are indicators of a shift in 
the material distribution of power, for a hegemonic succession to occur, there needs to be clear evidence 
of an effective socialization of China’s purpose and support for its preferred order, which are non-
existent. [52] 
Even if the need to regulate the financial sector globally is generally accepted, some argue that the 
action in financial regulation is local, which limits the effectiveness of the G-20. [53] The financial crisis 
has clearly shown that there is now a national as well as international dimension to all of these problems 
and their solutions. [54] It is argued that convergence and divergence of governmental positions regarding 
the global governance reform, specifically the reform of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the 
banking sector (and international financial system) cannot be explained only by the logic of the 
international system, institutions and globalization. Domestic ideas and interests affect positions. [55] 
Because of this, governance of global finance should be reformed by taking account important changes in 
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the organization of global financial relations between financial intermediaries, their home governments 
and sovereign wealth funds (SWFs). 
One of the obstacles in front of the regulatory reform of the financial sector is the “revolving doors” 
issue, according to which regulators are encouraged to become compliant with industry demands through 
implicit promises of lucrative future careers in the regulated industry. In the U.S., a “Wall Street-
Washington corridor”, according to which many Goldman Sachs employees took up important positions 
at the Treasury and the Federal Reserve and then returned to the industry, is seen as one of the obstacles 
in front of the financial sector regulation. [56] 
5. Conclusion 
The financial crisis enhanced the importance of the global governance system since it was clearly seen 
that the restructuring of the international financial and monetary system required collaboration of 
developing and developed countries. In this conjuncture, the G-20 came out as the organization that could 
abate the representativeness, coherence and compliance deficits of the global governance system. At the 
initial phases of the global crisis, the G-20 countries reached consensus at least on some issues. 
Nonetheless, as emergency receded, monetary and fiscal policy preferences of the Anglo-Saxons, the 
European countries and the developing countries started to diverge because of asymmetry of interests. 
As the policy preferences diverged, the global governance reforms came to a halt and bigger problems 
left unresolved while states attempted to stave off the crisis by short-term policies. In this process, the G-
20 lost its effectiveness at some extent and cleavages among the Anglo-Saxons, the Europeans and the 
developing countries (particularly the BRIC countries) with regards to issues such as the reform of the 
governance structures of the international financial institutions widened.  
It is expected that global governance reforms will proceed slowly and stay relatively limited. It is 
anticipated that if interests of the Anglo-Saxons, the European countries and the developing countries 
diverge furthermore, the reform of the global governance reform may become a conflict zone of 
international politics. 
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